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NONFARM HOUSEHOLDS are the principal group of savers, typically
accounting for about three-fifths of gross national saving in the
American economy.1 Logically, then, we should give primary atten-
tion to the question of how retirement income programs affect the
saving of individual family units, commonly referred to as personal
saving to distinguish it from saving by corporate business, unincor-
porated businesses and farms, and units of government.
THE ISSUES INVOLVED
From the national income and product accounts prepared by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, the picture below emerges of per-
sonal income, personal saving, and retirement saving. However
measured, retirement saving represents a major share of personal
saving and its importance has increased during the first two postwar
decades. By all past standards, the systematic provision of retire-
ment income by funding through financial institutions, as distin-
guished from transfer payments, has become the most important
new element in the saving process.
Whether this form of saving represents a substitution for other
forms or a net addition to the aggregate saving of households be-
1 Based upon the flow-of-funds accounts of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. Households provide an even larger proportion of net
saving in the economy.54 Economic Aspects of Pensions
A verage, Average, Average, Average,
1946—50 195 1—551956—60 1961—65
Personalincome (billions of
dollars) a 203.0 283.4 366.0 472.0
Personal saving (billions of
dollars) a 11.7 17.2 19.9 23.2
Retirement saving (biffions
of dollars)' 2.7 4.6 7.2 9.9
Personal saving as percent-
age of personal income 5.8 6.1 5.4 4.9
Retirement saving as per-
centage of personal
income 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.1
Retirement saving as per-
centage of personal
saving 23.1 26.7 36.2 42.7
Note: If personal saving is expressed as a percentage of disposable personal income,
the saving ratios for the four 5-year periods are 6.4, 6.9, 6.2, and 5.6 per cent, respectively.
Using the ratio to personal income is considered more relevant since most of the pension
saving is, in effect, from pretax income; i.e., employer contributions to public and private
plans are not recognized as taxable income to the employee.
aNationalincome accounts of the U.S. Department of Commerce, SurveyofCurrent
Business.
bFlow-of-fundsaccounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Measures increase in assets held by governmental and private pension programs, ex-
cluding OASDI.
comes a key question in determining the future volume, composi-
tion, and trend of saving and capital formation in the American
economy. The research of Raymond W. Goldsmith2 has established
the long-term stability in the ratio of saving to income. Despite the
development of new financial institutions such as life insurance
companies, savings and loan consumer finance compa-
nies, investment companies, savings banks, and credit unions, the
2AStudy of Saving in the United States, Princeton, N.J., 1955, Vol. I, pp. 4—22.Effect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 55
recordof the past ninety years shows remarkable stability in the
saving ratio.
There have, of course, been great changes in the preferences of
individuals for different types of financial assets. Financial interme-
diaries have enjoyed varying rates of growth as the public has
shifted its favor from one to another form of saving medium. The
secular trend toward the institutionalization of saving has afforded
ample opportunities for growth in the case of most intermediaries
despite the changing emphasis of individuals on different character-
istics of saving media.3
It is quite consistent with the record of the past, therefore, to
expect that households will substitute for other savings the accumu-
lation of an interest or equity in a pension program. With this form
of income for life after retirement assured by coverage under a
public or private plan, it would appear to be less necessary or
desirable to save during working years by means of savings ac-
counts, life insurance, or home ownership. If this is the way people
react, we should expect them to substitute retirement saving for
saving in other forms. The substitution might well be less. than
complete, however, because of certain characteristics of saving
through a pension plan: (1) The realization of full pension benefits
may depend upon continuity of employment in the event of delayed
or graded vesting. (2) An equity in a pension plan is illiquid. It
cannot be drawn on as can other forms of saving in the interim
period prior to retirement for other purposes. (3) Contributions to
retirement programs are usually compulsory. As a result, the partic-
ipant may have accumulated for his benefit sums well in excess of
the amounts which he would voluntarily save in any form. Workers
employed at lower pay scales might, indeed, have their pension
equities as virtually their only form of saving.
A working hypothesis derived from general observation and ex-
Exceptions are the Postal Savings System (discontinued in 1.66) and possibly
U.S. Savings Bonds. For a comprehensive view of these trends, see Raymond W.
Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900, Prince-
ton University Press for NBER, 1958.56 EconomicAspects of Pensions
perience would be that households covered under pension plans
would save more, other influences on the saving ratio held equal,
than those not covered. The substitution would be substantially less
than complete because of the special character of retirement savings
and their lack of availability to serve other desired objectives.4
THE CAGAN ANALYSIS
How, in fact, do households react in their saving patterns to cover-
age under a pension program supplementary to social security? This
is the question Phillip Cagan sought to answer. Available resources
did not afford an opportunity to survey a representative sample
of American households, but the cooperation of a sizable group of
Consumers Union subscribers made possible a detailed analysis of
their saving behavior and holdings of financial assets. This group
was clearly not representative of the population at large because of
higher incomes, greater educational attainments, and the predomi-
nance of salaried workers as heads of households.
The deficiency in representativeness of the sample is partly com-
pensated for by certain of its favorable characteristics. Consumers
Union subscribers may be presumed to be better informed about
their financial affairs, more thoughtful about their financial deci-
sions, and better equipped to respond to lengthy questionnaires.
The 11,513 households actually used in the analysis also represent
a very substantial number of cases of middle- and upper-income
households in which saving is important. Over 59percent had
annual incomes between $5,000 and $10,000, and almost 34 per
cent enjoyed a household income of $10,000 and above in 1958—
59.
It is plausible, although not demonstrable, that this more knowl-
edgeable group of households reflects the reaction to pension cover-
For a discussion of possible ranges of substitution, see Daniel M. Holland,
"What Can We Expect From Pensions?" Harvard Business Review, July—August
1959, pp. 125—140; and Challis A. Hall, Jr., "Retirement Contributions, the Spend-
ing Stream and Growth," Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability,
Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Washington, 1955, pp. 786—797.Effect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 57
age which will be characteristic of a much more representative
sample of American households in years to come as they become
better informed about their pension equities and as they see more of
their friends, relatives, and coworkers actually receiving benefits. If
we assume that employers and the representatives of employees will
continue actively to promote better education of covered workers
about prospective benefits, as they have compelling reasons to do,
one could argue that the reactions of the select group of Consumers
Union members would be indicative of the saving behavior of the
population at large during a subsequent period.
However, it is not necessary to repeat here the close reasoning
and analysis which Cagan applied to his survey of households. Only
certain highlights of his study need to be introduced at this point.
Excluding households with significant gains and losses and extreme
saving ratios, Cagan found the average saving ratios (saving as a






Discretionary saving in the form of in-
creases in cash and securities minus in-
creases in nonmortgage debt 2.8 2.1
Contractual saving in the form of in-
creases in equities inlifeinsurance,
annuities, and real estate 5.9 5.7
Subtotal 8.7 7.7
Pension saving in the form of increases in
equities in pension plans 2.8 —
Totalsaving ratio 11.5 7.7
Source: Phillip Cagan, Tue Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving, New York,
NBER, 1965, Table 4, p. 21. The number of households included is 8,008 for the covered
group and 2,911 for the not-covered.58 EconomicAspects of Pensions
Although respondents to the survey clearly, underestimated the in-
crease in their pension equities, presumably because of their lack of
information about employer contributions, the proposition that sav-
ing in forms other than through pensions is not reduced in the
average household, and may even be increased, is clearly supported
by Cagan's findings. Furthermore, he shows that this pattern of
behavior is not restricted to either discretionary or contractual sav-
ing forms.5
The conclusion that pension saving represents a net addition to
personal saving, i.e., that it is not substituted for other forms of
saving, is sufficiently startling in the light of the history of saving
habits to call for some explanation.6 The explanation which seems
to fit the facts best is that there is a "recognition effect" associated
with pension coverage. That is to say, the head of a household
recognizes that a reasonable degree of financial independence in
retirement is attainable for him when a pension program is made
applicable to him in addition to his social security income pros-
pects. At this point, his motivation to save on his own to increase
the adequacy of his retirement income is stimulated by the realiza-
tion that such a goal is within his grasp. The fact that it was not
similarly attainable by his parents, who are in some degree depen-
dent upon him, may heighten the impact of this recognition effect.
Conceivably, this stimulus to saving in other forms will weaken
over an employee's lifetime as his pension benefits become fully
vested and he has in fact saved to supplement his prospective
benefits. Cagan's study suggests that while the recognition effect
predominates, there does exist evidence of an offsetting substitution
effect in the case of those who contribute 5percent or more of their
compensation to the pension plan and enjoy full vesting. The
strongest recognition effect, on the other hand, is found in those
Tests of the validity of these conclusions and examinations of the data for
possible biases are set forth in Cagan's analysis and are not repeated here.
BGeorgeGarvy was among the first economists to recognize this possibility and
to suggest reasons for it. See his "The Effect of Private Pension Plans on Personal
Savings," Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1950, pp. 223—226.Effect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 59
cases where the individual contributes at a modest rate and has only
partially vested rights to his pension. The recognition effect seems to
be least powerful when the household head does not contribute to
the plan and has no vesting.
The argument that a contributory pension plan is more meaning-
ful to -the employee than a noncontributory one is apparently sup-
ported by these findings. Further, the transformation of a remote
contmgent benefit prospect into an emerging firm promise as vesting
is earned seems to act as a catalyst in the individual's making of
decisions to save for his old age.
The operation of both recognition and substitution effects in
producing the average behavior of households in the Consumers
Union panel suggests that the impact of pension programs on aggre-
gate personal saving can change over time if there are changes in the
structure of pension arrangements. This must be kept in mind when
we turn to the question of implications of Cagan's findings for the
future.
CORROBORATION OF CAGAN'S FINDINGS
Writing in The Mass Consumption Society, George Katona of the
Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, discusses the recognition effect in these words:
Being assured of some, for most people insufficient, funds after retire-
ment, the provision of adequate funds during old age no longer appears
an insurmountably difficult problem; being closer to the goal stimulates
people to work harder to achieve the goal, and therefore collective retire-
ment plans promote individual saving.
This hypothesis is derived from the goal-gradient hypothesis which
assumes that effort is intensified the closer one is to one's goal..
Goalsthat are believed to be attainable stimulate us to a much greater
extent than improbable dreams.7
This, then, is a rationale based upon the study of human behavior
for the results obtained in Cagan's study.
New York, 1964, pp.184—18560 Economic Aspects of Pensions
The other major question raised about Cagan's conclusions re-
lates to the nature of his sample. Admittedly, it is debatable whether
the reactions of the particular group of Consumers Union respon-
dents can be accepted as valid for the American population as a
whole. Fortunately, important evidence on this question has been
provided in a subsequent study by Katona and his staff at the
University of Michigan. With the assistance of a research grant
from the Social Security Administration, Katona surveyed a repre-
sentative sample of households in the continental United States in
1962 and 1963. His findings completely support the existence of
the recognition effect of pension coverage.8
Pension coverage, according to this survey, increases both saving
behavior and saving-mindedness. Those expecting an adequate re-
tirement income, furthermore, save at least as much on average as
those who expect an income below their needs. The effects of rising
levels of aspiration, stimulated by accomplishment, in motivating
saving are seen as the powerful factors; fear of the future seems to
provide much less motivation for saving for the distant prospect of
retirement.
FUTURE TRENDS
The Cagan study, like any cross-sectional analysis, has its maxi-
mum significance in relation to the environment in which it was
made. The similarity of results from Katona's survey four years
later might suggest that we are dealing with fairly stable phe-
nomena. But we must bear in mind the possibility of changes in
personal saving patterns in response to changes in the pension
structure.
The trend to noncontributory plans should erode the substitution
effect which Cagan observed to be stronger when employee contri-
butions are substantial. Earlier coverage for employees, together
8GeorgeKatona, Private Pensions and Individual Saving, Monograph No. 40,
Survey Research Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965.Effect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 61
with the prospect of sooner achieving vesting, might increase the
recognition effect. Greater knowledge of the meaning of pension
coverage does not seem to have a discernible effect upon the saving
ratio. Thus, we can identify some factors which might, on balance,
modify saving behavior. It would be hazardous to guess the net
result, but it seems unlikely that in the near future pension coverage
will reduce saving in other forms. This conclusion is supported by
the evidence suggesting that the recognition effect does not "wear
off" with the passage of years of covered employment.
Apart from these changes in the terms of pension arrangements,
of course, there is the possibility that if benefit formulas are liberal-
ized, some of the retirement saving motivation might be sapped.
The extreme case would be that in which larger social security
benefits and higher supplementary pension benefits would substan-
tially equal the reduced cost of maintaining the same standard of
living as during the last working years. This situation is not in
prospect for the visible future, but the movement in that direction
persists, particularly in reducing the cost of maintaining living
standards by programs such as Medicare and by the lower income
tax applicable to retirement income. Rising levels of aspirations,
after all, can apply to standards of living during the period before as
well as the period after retirement.
In any event, the value of repeating the Cagan and Katona
surveys within the next decade is apparent. With the further exten-
sion of coverage and the maturing of the pension structure further
advanced, it should be fruitful to test the reactions of households to
pension coverage once again.
Putting to one side this rather speculative question of a possible
shift in the balance between the recognition and substitution effects
of pension coverage, what are some of the implications for personal
saving in the American economy of the prospective growth of
pension arrangements? Holland's projections show that benefit pay-
ments are likely to be rising at a more rapid rate than contributions
inyears ahead. The rate of growth in retirement saving could62 Economic Aspects of Pensions
slacken. The implications are pictured below by comparing possible
1975 with actual 1965 relationships.
This exercise suggests that, unless Holland's projections mate-
rially underestimate the rate of retirement saving in another decade,
the impact on aggregate personal saving is now at a peak and will
diminish. That is to say, the fraction of personal saving represented
by retirement saving is currently close to its maximum. Unless there
1965 1975 a
Personalincome (billions of dollars) 537.8 894.9
Personal saving (billions of dollars) 27.2 48.5
Retirement saving (billions of dollars) 10.9 15.1
Personal saving as percentage of personal
income 5.1 5.4
Retirement saving as percentage of personal
income 2.0 1.7
Retirement saving as percentage of personal
saving 40.1 31.1
aPersonalincome and personal saving from a representative projection of national
income accounts made by the National Industrial Conference Board in "The Economy
in the Next Decade," The Conference Board Record, December 1965. This projection is
roughly in line with other projections made by governmental and private agencies.
Retirement saving is calculated from Holland's projections of about $13.6 billion in
1975 for private and state and local government programs, and it is assumed that, as in
1965, this will be nine-tenths of a $15.1 billion total including the funding of federal
government plans.
is a new burst of growth in retirement saving during the years
ahead, or in other forms of saving, the projected saving ratio will
not be realized.
No doubt, a portion of a possible decline in the saving ratio will
disappear if consumer durables are included, since consumer ex-
penditures are expected to rise more rapidly in this area than in the
case of services or nondurable goods. Also we may be victims of
measurement problems. Saving through expenditures on such intan-
gible capital assets as education (we could even add cultural andEffect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 63
personal capital derived from "investment" in travel, .the arts, and
good works) is not treated as saving in conventional accounting.
One of the consequences of gains in living standards can simply be
a shift to saving through the accumulation of such intangible assets.9
However, for our subsequent analysis of capital market in-
fluences, we must concentrate on the implications of the unfolding
pattern of financial saving in the economy. In this dimension of the
economic effects of pensions, we conclude that the impact of rapid
growth is close to its peak; that in the absence of a resurgence of
growth in pension arrangements, we have already experienced the
major part of their influence on saving and the capital markets
during the second postwar decade.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON SAVING BY BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
On the basis of our earlier analysis in Chapter III, it appears that
the growth of private pensions has probably not had any material
effect on saving by business.
Federal, state, and local government saving is substantial in the
absence of major wars and depressions. Changes in the net worth of
these units, taking into account tangible assets as well as financial
claims, are somewhat irregular and sensitive to economic change.
With so many forces affecting the levels of revenues and expendi-
tures, it is difficult to isolate the effects of pension arrangements in
specific terms. At times, of course, the question relates to changes
not in saving but in dissaving.
The revenues of the federal government, and other units of gov-
ernment in certain instances, are lower than they would otherwise
be as a result of not taxing currently as income to the covered
employee those contributions which the employer makes to pension
programs. In 1965, such contributions exceeded $10 billion, of
which two-thirds were supplied by private and one-third by public
the significance of these forms of saving, see F. Thomas Juster, Household
Capital Formation and Financing, 1897—1 962, New York, NBER, 1966.64 Economic Aspects of Pensions
employers. This figure does not accurately reflect the true situation
because the federal civil service and some state systems are greatly
underfunded; i.e., the employer's contribution substantially under-
states the growth in the employee's equity in the program. The
extreme case, of course, is the retirement program for members of
the armed services under which benefits are paid as current budget-
ary expenses. The membçr earns a right to retirement benefits, but
that equity is not recognized until he starts to draw them. The same
is true of additional billions of employer contributions to a wide
range of health and insurance benefit programs.
The figure which appears in the flow-of-funds accounts as retire-
ment saving is, we should constantly bear in mind, only the increase
in assets held in trust funds or as offsets to life insurance reserves.
This is not necessarily the same figure as the present value of
pension claims accrued during a year after discounting for mortality
and turnover factors. What the real figure is no one knows, but,
particularly in public programs, there is a very substantial under-
statement. It is clear, however, that we are measuring only financial
claims which are specifically recognized, rather than the growth of
individuals' pension equities.
Whatever the true magnitudes, there is a partial offset in that
pension benefits received as a result of employer contributions are
taxed as income, with the exception of OASDI benefits, are,
of course, not taxed. The offset is reduced by the more favorable tax
treatment of persons over 65 and the fact that lower rates are
applicable on the average for the person no longer actively em-
ployed.
Thus we can say that the growth of public and private pensions
has eroded the revenue base for taxation based upon income. The
simplest illustration is the recent trend in some state and local
government retirement programs to take over a portion of the
employee's contribution instead of increasing salaries. The same
result is achieved by increasing benefits without changing the em-
ployee's contribution rate.
Another important tax exemption is that of the income earned byEffect of Pensions on Aggregate Saving 65
apension fund. The amount of this untaxed income has, of course,
grown rapidly as public and private systems have accumulated
assets. Exclusive of federal programs, such untaxed earnings are
about one-half of the employer contributions.
Substantial but unmeasured reductions in federal, state, and local
expenditures are made possible by the flow of pension benefits. We
have observed the partial displacement of old-age assistance by
social security as an example. Given a target of well-being sought
for the aged, the existence of pension benefits may afford govern-
mental units substantial economies in their necessary outlays for
supporting housing projects, other community facilities, and agen-
cies.
The effect on government saving isdifficult to determine, as
Cagan has pointed out. It seems doubtful that this one element in
the tax structure affects the level of expenditures by government. If
federal and state taxes on income are higher as a consequence, the
principal result may be a reduction in the level of other saving,
particularly personal saving by upper-income individuals. However,
saving in the aggregate is larger, we have seen, by the full amount of
retirement saving. Thus, a discernible result may be to make savings
by different income groups less unequal than would otherwise be
the case. That is, the lower-income groups may save more, and the
higher-income groups less.
If the pension structure is designed to shift income earned in
productive effort from the working years to the years of retirement,
it is not unreasonable to shift the incidence of taxation with it. If
there were no differential in applicable rates of tax, revenues would
be unchanged after the transitional period. However, the double
personal exemption for those over 65,theretirement income credit,
and the exclusion of OASDI benefits from tax are all steps designed
to lighten the tax burden on pension benefits. Thus, employees in
the aggregate, if we assume some stable revenue requirement, pay
higher income taxes on wages and salaries during employment and
lower taxes after retirement. In this light, the public and private
pension structure is a mammoth transfer operation, probably with-66 Economic Aspects of Pensions
out any important impact on government saving in either direction.
In another sense, also, the argument is admissible that the tax
benefits afforded systematic programs to provide retirement in-
comes supplementary to OASDI have nothing to do with govern-
ment saving. A long-term decision is reached that encouragement
should be given to certain financial arrangements. Having made this
decision, governmental actions are taken to establish whatever pat-
tern of revenue and expenditure policies seems most likely to afford
promise of sustained economic growth and rising living standards.
THE IMPACT ON TOTAL NATIONAL SAVING
Our research has supported the proposition that pension saving is a
net addition to personal saving. Less clearly established, perhaps, is
the extension of this conclusion to state that it is a net addition to
total national saving. The impact on saving by business and govern-
ment is not clear, but. it seems doubtful that it is materially affected.
Therealso some evidence that this major impact has already
been felt. If it is desirable to sustain the growth of saving in the
economy, some other economic policies may be more fruitful in the
future. On balance, however, the tax and other policies which have
fostered pension fund growth appear to have been appropriate, in
the environment of the postwar years, to the objective of increasing
saving. If balanced economic growth should require either a higher
level of saving or a higher level of consumption in the future, it will
be most desirable to resurvey this whole topic again.
It is evident, however, that the long-term nature of pension ar-
rangements makes them unsuitable as a focal point for short-term
adjustments in the pattern of spending and saving. Tax and expend-
iture policies designed to foster stable economic growth can clearly
be more effectively applied to areas which are more sensitive to
temporary influences. In their application, however, recognition
should be given to the secular changes brought about by the matur-
ing pension structure.